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Why Hasn’t High-Frequency Trading Swept the Board?  










In today’s trading of liquid financial instruments, there are two main contending agencements 
(in Callon’s ‘actor-network’ sense of combinations of humans and nonhuman elements that 
manifest distributed agency): one agencement yokes together automated high-frequency 
trading (HFT) and open, anonymous electronic order books; the other is organized above all 
around the distinction between ‘dealers’ and ‘clients’. Drawing upon interviews with 321 
market participants, we examine differences in the relative presence of the two agencements. 
We focus in this article on the processes that have given rise to especially sharp differences 
between the trading of shares and of sovereign bonds, and between the trading of the latter in 
the US and Europe. The article contributes to two literatures: the sociological literature on 
trading (especially on HFT), which we argue needs expanded to encompass what can be 
 
 
called ‘the politics of market structure’; and the nascent political-economy literature on the 
processes shaping how sovereign bonds are traded. In terms of underlying theory, we 
advocate far greater attention in actor-network economic sociology to the state and its 
agencies and a stronger focus in political economy on materiality. 
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A fundamental divide runs through today’s financial trading. Some trading involves advanced 
technology, rapid data dissemination and order placement, automation and anonymity: the 
world of high-frequency trading. Other trading is more human-centred, human-paced and 
often opaque. Data dissemination is at times deliberately slow and personal relationships and 
trust continue to play central roles. This article investigates stark differences in the prevalence 
of these two forms, focusing on the trading in shares and in sovereign bonds in the US and 
Europe. We conceptualize both forms as agencements. Although the academic concept has its 
roots in the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1975; see also 2004), the way in which we use it 
follows Callon (2005 and 2007). As in everyday French, an agencement is an arrangement: in 
Callon’s words ‘a combination of heterogeneous elements’, both human beings and ‘non-
humans’ such as technical artefacts, objects, etc., or in our case algorithms and order books 
(Callon 2007, p. 320). The ‘actor-network theory’ to which Callon’s work belongs (along 
with that of Latour, Mol, Law and many others) emphatically rejects, however, the everyday 
assumption of passive things configured by an active human ‘arranger’. The term agencement 
contains a deliberate pun (missing in its standard English translation as ‘assemblage’) with 
agence, agency. Callon’s – indeed, actor-network theory’s – core argument is that agency is 
distributed. The capacity to act belongs with the entire arrangement, not with its human 
components alone: ‘agencements are arrangements endowed with a capacity of acting in 
different ways depending on their configuration’ (Callon 2007, p. 320).1 
Consider what we conceptualize as the high-frequency trading/anonymous order-book 
agencement. First, HFT cannot be reduced to the goals, actions or beliefs of the human beings 
                                                             
1 In contrast to the more widely used notion of ‘assemblage’, the term agencement thus more explicitly follows 
the prescription – at the core of actor-network theory – to avoid making a priori distinctions between human 
agents and the things they ‘assemble’ or ‘arrange’ (Callon 2007, p. 320; see also Braun 2016; for an analysis 




involved: it is intrinsically sociomaterial, and the human beings involved do not control the 
actions of HFT algorithms in any detail, and quite often do not fully understand those 
actions.2 Second, more is involved in HFT’s materiality than simply HFT firms’ algorithms 
and technical systems. The agencement also includes the exchanges or other trading venues 
on which this form of trading takes place, where an ‘exchange’ is not simply an organization 
but also a material system. HFT has historically been linked tightly to markets structured 
around anonymous, open, electronic order books (see Figure 1). Any market participant can 
directly enter into such an order book anonymous bids to buy and offers to sell the financial 
instrument being traded, and can ‘see’ (in an electronically mediated fashion) others’ 
anonymous bids and offers. Third, high-frequency trading and exchanges shape each other 
sociomaterially: not only must HFT adapt to the characteristics of exchanges’ technical 
systems, but competition among exchanges for market share means their systems also have to 
adapt to HFT. Fourth, in the full-blown form of the agencement found in share trading in the 
US and Europe (and, increasingly, in much of the rest of the world too), the term ‘have to’ in 
the previous sentence is correct. Exchanges have choices, but even exchanges such as IEX 
that are – simplistically – thought of as anti-HFT (Lewis, 2014) are shaped by it. The 
HFT/anonymous order-book agencement is demiurgic: it changes things, in a way that – once 
again – is not reducible to human intentionality. It is an ‘acentred system … without a central 
agency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 17), but it does things and changes things.  
                                                             
2 The materiality on which this article (and indeed most actor-network studies) focuses is sociomateriality, 
namely the concrete practices and processes that involve both human and non-human beings as actors or, more 
precisely, ‘actants’. For an analysis of HFT’s (socio)materiality see author (2018). How ‘materality matters’ and 
the role of devices in shaping or constituting financial market practice has been an important focal point of the 
social studies of finance, which have scrutinised the sociomateriality of, inter alia, calculators (Beunza and 
Muniesa, 2005), financial models (Svetlova 2018), trading rooms (Beunza and Stark, 2004), screens (Knorr 





What HFT confronts is a second, older agencement that is also sociomaterial, but in 
which what one might call the ‘relative weight’ of human beings and interpersonal 
relationships is greater. We call this agencement the ‘dealer-client agencement’, because that 
distinction between roles is what structures it (see Figure 2). In a dealer-client market, those 
organizations that are classed as ‘clients’ (which can include even the biggest hedge funds, 
investment-management firms or non-financial corporations, along with, e.g., smaller banks) 
do not trade directly among themselves, but only via dealers. In contrast, dealers trade both 
with clients and with each other, in the latter case often via interdealer brokers. In a dealer-
client agencement, in other words, dealers are ‘price-makers’ (disseminating, either 
continuously or on request, the prices at which they will trade), while clients are essentially 
‘price-takers’. The dealer-client distinction is not utterly rigid, but nevertheless structures 
how trading takes place (see Table 1 for a summary of the main differences between the two 
agencements).  
Dealer-client financial markets took their modern form in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, replacing face-to-face interaction on exchanges (the New York Stock 
Exchange or NYSE, London Stock Exchange, Paris Bourse, etc.) that historically had traded 
not just shares but also sovereign bonds. Although visual display screens came into use in 
dealer-client markets in the 1960s as a way of disseminating indicative prices, the technology 
that had initially allowed face-to-face trading to be bypassed was the telephone (Meeker, 
1930, p. 260). Clients wanting to buy or sell telephoned (and often still telephone) dealers, 
while interdealer brokers installed dedicated, permanently open telephone lines over which 
they talked (and still talk) throughout the trading day to dealers. Over the last twenty years, 
this use of the human voice and the telephone in the dealer-client agencement has been 




electronic trading remains largely bifurcated, with anonymous interdealer markets (such as 
BrokerTec) and separate non-anonymous dealer-client markets (such as Bloomberg FIT).  
The HFT/anonymous order book agencement has taken firm hold in some markets, 
for example in the trading of shares in the US, Europe, and much of the rest of the world. 
However, the dealer-client structure of other markets remains little altered: see Table 2, and 
also the quantitative data in Table 3. Notably, there is almost no high-frequency trading of 
Eurozone sovereign bonds, UK gilts, or other European sovereign debt. We have found other 
cases to be mixed. In US Treasurys, for instance, the HFT/order book agencement has 
colonized and thoroughly transformed the interdealer market, but has made only very limited 
inroads into the dealer-client market. Why these very different outcomes? What explains the 
capacity of some ‘market structures’ (market participants’ typical term for how trading is 
organized) to persist, while other market structures crumble?3 
These are, we would suggest, quintessentially political questions4, yet the literature of 
international political economy (IPE) has addressed them only obliquely, while the literature 
in sociology on trading (including the emergent sociological literature on HFT) has so far 
scarcely asked them.5 Investigating, as we therefore do, the politics of market structure does 
                                                             
3 For a demonstration of the importance of sovereign-bond market structure to the capacity of emerging-market 
governments to borrow, see author (2011, 2012 and 2019). What participants mean by ‘market structure’ is 
similar to what financial economists (following Garman, 1976) call ‘market microstructure’: ‘the process by 
which investors’ latent demands are ultimately translated into prices and volumes’ (Madhavan, 2000, p. 205). 
The literature in economics on market microstructure is valuable, but is largely ‘depoliticized’. Although 
contributors to it are certainly aware that market structure is often the focus of intense conflict, that conflict is 
seldom if ever the focus of their analytical attention. 
4 This article does not take a normative position regarding the merits of HFT, the primary dealer system or any 
underlying disputes.  
5 The closest the literature on HFT has come to addressing the politics of market structure is perhaps Castelle et 
al. (2016) and Coombs (2016). Important contributions that do not deal with that issue include Lange (2016) and 




not, though, involve abandoning the actor-network (ANT) emphasis on agencements and 
materiality. Our argument, rather, is that actor-network analyses of trading need a stronger 
focus on issues of the state and politics, while work on finance in the political-economy 
tradition should be more attentive to trading’s materiality. It is, for example, quite impossible 
to understand today’s politics of market structure without grasping a central material 
consideration on which our interviewees were agreed: that HFT firms’ technical systems are 
nearly always faster than those of even the largest and most sophisticated banks. While the 
performativity thesis (one of ANT’s offshoots) has been embraced by IPE scholarship (e.g. 
Braun, 2016; Heimberger and Kapeller, 2017; Lockwood, 2015), barring a few exceptions 
(notably Campbell-Verduyn et al., 2019) ANT more broadly has thus far eluded sustained 
engagement. Complementing this article’s empirical contribution, we wish to take up recent 
calls for productive engagement between IPE and ANT (Best and Walters, 2013; Campbell-
Verduyn et al., 2019).  
In so doing, we seek to advance this nascent dialogue by focusing on very different 
outcomes in the financial markets we consider and the politics leading to those outcomes. 
The materiality ANT encourages us to analyse, in other words, cannot explain outcomes on 
its own: the fastest trading systems do not inevitably determine market structure. 
Governments and their agencies, we suggest below, have had an important influence on the 
evolution of market structures in the trading of both shares and sovereign bonds, albeit in 
entirely different ways. Viewing the role of the state actors in field-theoretical terms focuses 
on the interdependent relation between state actors and market participants.6 In all four of our 
cases (shares and sovereign bonds in the US and Europe), the struggle between what field 
theorists label as ‘incumbent’ market actors, whose relative dominance is reflected in market 
                                                             
6 In viewing politics in field-theoretical terms, we adopt a narrow understanding of the political that focuses on 
the role of the state and direct state regulation. As indicated, for instance, by literature which conceptualizes 




practices, and the ‘challengers’, or those actors that strategically seek to upend the normal 
state of affairs, has been a key factor in the evolutionary processes of market structures too 
(Bourdieu, 1997; Fligstein 2001; Fligstein & McAdam 2012). Field theory ‒ at least in its 
institutional rendition by Neil Fligstein and others ‒ posits the idea ‘that incumbents and 
challengers are engaged in an iterative strategic dance, continuously modifying their 
strategies and tactics in response to the earlier moves of other actors in the field’ (Fligstein 
and McAdam, 2012, 84). Crucially, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) see state actors as key 
actors not only in the emergence of new market fields but also as an external resource on 
which incumbents may come to rely for the reproduction of their dominant position within a 
given market. 
The addition of a field-theoretic perspective to ANT’s potential contribution to IPE  
therefore highlights the ways in which technological developments and the conflicts they can 
cause result in change, and speaks loudly to some of IPE’s key research themes, namely the 
structure of international finance, public/private power, and the role of agency, in addition to 
specific research strands within the discipline, notably HFT (e.g. Campbell-Verduyn et al., 
2017), central clearing (e.g. Lockwood, 2018; Gabor and Ban, 2015), and debt management 
(e.g. Fastenrath et al., 2017).  
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. We first discuss our approach. 
In part II, we analyse the agencement of HFT in the trading of shares, noting striking 
similarities in Europe and US. In part III, we turn our attention to the market for sovereign 
bonds and find not only that this agencement differs markedly from the one described for 
shares, but also that there are important differences between the European and the US 





Cases and Data Sources 
The research underpinning this article encompasses all the classes of financial instruments 
that are sufficiently liquid that high-frequency trading of them seems, in principle, possible: 
shares, sovereign bonds, futures, foreign exchange, listed options and interest-rate swaps. 
Examining all of these in a single article is impossible, so our approach is to focus here on 
shares and sovereign bonds (traders in both markets will commonly also trade futures). This 
selection is motivated by two key factors. First, both are simple, standard, liquid securities, 
which, as already noted, used to be traded in the same way in the same trading venues. 
Secondly, as is shown by the data in Table 3, they are now traded in quite different ways – 
including, in the case of sovereign bonds, differently between the US and Europe. Our goal in 
this article is to highlight important processes that have led to these different outcomes, with 
the aim of contributing to the development of hypotheses regarding those outcomes. 
Our focus on the trading of Treasurys and other sovereign bonds has a virtue quite 
separate from the sharp contrast with the trading of shares. US Treasurys are, arguably, the 
world’s most important securities: they are not simply how the Federal government funds its 
deficit, but also the quintessential ‘safe haven’ or ‘shock absorber’ of the financial system, 
high-quality collateral that oils the wheels of finance (Gabor, 2016), and the most salient 
single form in which overseas central banks hold their foreign-exchange reserves. It is, 
therefore, striking that we can find no sociological or IPE work on the mechanisms of 
Treasurys trading since the pioneering ethnography of the late-1980s’ Treasurys market by 
Abolafia (1996, chapter 1). It is as if scholars have implicitly shared the viewpoint on trading 
that seems to have been held by US officials (at least until violent, and still not fully 
explained, price gyrations in Treasurys in a 12-minute period in the morning of 15 October 
2014: see below): that the Treasurys market ‘works’ – enables the US to borrow on a large 




In contrast, most European governments have not been able to be complacent about 
borrowing, and the project of European Economic and Monetary Union fundamentally 
altered the situation of the governments of what became the Eurozone. IPE scholars (Dutta, 
2018; Fastenrath et al., 2017; Lagna, 2016; Preunkert, 2017; Trampusch, 2015) have 
identified active efforts by European governments from the 1980s onwards to shape the 
markets for their sovereign bonds, and thus implicitly have begun to trace the origins – much 
more recent in Europe than in the US – of the dealer-client agencement. European ‘states 
mobilize[d] markets for particular policy aims’ (Dutta, 2018, p. 7), especially to enhance their 
capacity to borrow. They imported American practices such as bond auctions and the 
designation of primary dealers with obligations to bid in those auctions and to facilitate 
subsequent ‘secondary’ trading of sovereign bonds.  
In the different outcomes between share and bond trading, we see the dynamic 
interactions between state and market actors as a key driver in the advancement (or 
impediment) of the HFT/anonymous order-book agencement. In the case of share trading, 
state actors in both the US and Europe perceived the changes, which inadvertently facilitated 
the rise of ‘challenger’ HFT firms and alternative trading systems, as an opportunity either to 
promote competition among traders and exchanges (US) or to pursue the political aim of 
capital market integration (Europe). In the trading of government bonds, however, our 
evidence suggests that state actors did not actively facilitate the advancement of the 
HFT/anonymous order-book agencement, ostensibly because of uncertainty about how it 
would impact the state’s ability to finance its debts. This provides one potential hypothesis 
for the different outcomes between shares and bonds. However, variation also exists between 
bond markets in the US and Europe. The dealer-client structure of European markets for 
sovereign debt has remained largely unchanged, while the US market has only seen the 




made inroads almost exclusively in the interdealer segment of the market. We do not see 
these differences as driven by the ideological commitments of state actors; our analysis, 
rather, focuses on possible hypotheses regarding pre-existing market structure and the 
relation between debt managers and primary dealers. 
What we have done in this article, therefore, is to construct primary-source narrative 
histories of our four cases (US and European share trading; US and European sovereign bond 
trading), and from those histories – which can be presented here only schematically7 – sought 
to explore preliminarily possible causal processes that might help explain the substantial 
differences among the historical trajectories of the four cases. Since the four cases differ on 
many dimensions, and idiosyncratic events are sometimes important, we attempt to offer only 
hypotheses that are subject to revision as further research is done – as we hope it will be – on 
the four cases. Nevertheless, we are confident that the narratives briefly presented below do 
capture essential aspects of the trajectories of the four cases. 
 Our main sources are interviews with 321 market participants, including high-
frequency traders, exchange staff, regulators, technology suppliers, traders for institutional-
investment firms, and dealers and brokers embedded in the dealer-client agencement (see 
Table 4). The full set of interviews covers not just shares and sovereign bonds, but also 
futures, foreign exchange, listed options and interest rate swaps. Because of the historically 
primary role played in changes in market structure by developments in the US, we conducted 
around two-thirds of the interviews in the main market centers there (117 interviewees are 
based in New York, and 97 in Chicago), with nearly all the remainder conducted in Europe. 
Particularly useful was our participation in two meetings attended by staff of government 
debt management offices of many countries: what they said in informal discussion very 
                                                             




helpfully complemented sometimes guarded formulations in interviews. We extensively 
triangulated interview evidence with documentary sources (the trade press, etc.), cross-
checked what differently-situated interviewees said about the same events and processes, 
conducted repeat interviews (sometimes multiple) with particularly well-placed interviewees, 
and participated in seven industry meetings. 
An Agencement Triumphant: The Transformation of US and European 
Share Trading 
United States 
Crucial components of the HFT/anonymous order book agencement first started to come 
together in the US in the second half of the 1990s in the trading of shares listed on Nasdaq, at 
that point a conventional dealer-client market in which prices were displayed on-screen but 
most trading was by telephone. Nasdaq had, though, introduced an electronic Small Order 
Execution System (SOES), which enabled brokers who serviced retail customers to send the 
latter’s small orders to dealers for automated execution at their on-screen prices. During the 
October 1987 stockmarket crash, many dealers simply ignored sell orders sent to them via 
SOES. Among the reforms of share trading imposed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) after the crash was a rule that dealers had to honor their on-screen prices 
when sent SOES orders (Ingebretsen, 2002). Some traders quickly realized that they could 
now use SOES profitably to trade against dealers’ price quotations that had become ‘stale’: 
i.e. out-of-date (interviewee BW). Multiple efforts by Nasdaq dealers to block the activities 
of these ‘SOES bandits’ all failed, and a lively culture of semi-professional SOES banditry 
emerged, especially in lower Manhattan.  
 In 1995, one of the ‘bandit’ lower Manhattan brokerages, Datek, set up a new, 




each other, especially to exit trading positions they had created using SOES. Island (which 
we discuss in author 2014 and which several of our HFT interviewees had worked for or 
traded on) was powered by an ultra-fast ‘matching engine’ (the software that manages an 
order book), and it offered unprecedently low fees, and also ‘rebates’: Island made small 
payments to traders or trading firms when bids or offers they had placed in its order book 
were executed against, with the goal of encouraging ‘market-making’ by trading firms (i.e. 
systematically filling order books with bids and offers). Market-making on Island was further 
facilitated by having a tick size (a minimum increment of price) of only 1/256th of a dollar, 
making it straightforward always slightly to improve on the prices being quoted (in the 
traditional eighths – and, later, sixteenths – of a dollar) by Nasdaq’s dealers. Island’s success 
encouraged the establishment in the second half of the 1990s of several other similar trading 
venues, collectively called Electronic Communications Networks or ECNs, which also 
competed mainly with Nasdaq’s dealers.  
 The state, however, played a key role through the regulator of share trading, the SEC, 
whose new rules unconsciously enabled HFT (author, 2018). Setting up new ECNs was made 
easier by the SEC’s 1998 Reg ATS (Regulation Alternative Trading System), which 
established a framework for doing so, and ECNs’ visibility to the market at large was 
increased by new SEC order-handling rules that forced Nasdaq dealers to display ECNs’ 
prices when they were better than their own (interviewees AF and RH). Although our 
interviews do not suggest any conscious attempt by the SEC to foster HFT (which was only 
nascent in the 1990s), that was their effect. There were differences among the ECNs, but they 
all offered low-fee, anonymous, electronic order-book trading, with Island leading the way 
(interviewee AF). One of the earliest HFT firms, Automated Trading Desk, quickly realized 




BT and BW; author 2017). Other nascent HFT firms also began trading on Island and on the 
other ECNs as well.  
 These developments were the first clear manifestation of the internal dynamic of the 
HFT/order book agencement. HFT firms quickly realized, e.g., that the NQ – the Nasdaq-100 
index future traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange – typically moved a fraction of a 
second before the underlying Nasdaq-listed shares. This made data on moves in the NQ 
(transmitted from Chicago first by fast fiber-optic cable and then microwave) a vitally 
important ‘signal’ for algorithmic share trading. The presence of HFT algorithms – especially 
market-making algorithms – rapidly boosted ECNs’ trading volumes, while ECNs actively 
sought to shape their technological systems so as to facilitate HFT. As an interviewee (DB) 
who moved from an ECN to a HFT firm put it:  
it was the same [HFT] firms who were the big customers of Island and [other ECNs], 
and they all had the same wants and desires out of an electronic trading system … 
that’s why … you start to see market structure coalesce around … low latency [i.e. 
fast speed], pricing tiers [lower fees for firms trading large volumes of shares], very 
similar [technical] functionality, because the same principal actors [HFT firms] who 
were feeding the same list of desires to exchanges globally and they all say ‘if you do 
A, B, C to X, Y, Z, I will be able to do more business on your platform’.  
 Competition between ECNs and established trading venues was facilitated by the fact 
that – following a 1970s’ reform pressed for by Congress – the US had a unified national 
system for the clearing and settlement of share transactions (described, e.g., by interviewees 
GV and GW). Whoever the parties to a trade were, and whatever the exchange or ECN on 
which the trade had been done, it was recorded, guaranteed, and processed by a single, 




seem to have found it easy to interact electronically with the NSCC, and – crucially – shares 
bought on an ECN could therefore readily be sold on another ECN or on Nasdaq.  
 By the early 2000s, Nasdaq’s share of the trading of Nasdaq-listed shares had 
plummeted, and in response it bought two ECNs and radically transformed its own market 
structure, moving from a dealer-client structure to a fast, open, anonymous electronic order 
book. The other chief established trading venue, the New York Stock Exchange, was initially 
protected from the ECNs by the SEC-mandated Intermarket Trading System, a slow (1970s-
vintage) system that had to be used by venues seeking to trade shares listed on the NYSE on 
any large scale. In 2005, however, the SEC scrapped the requirement to use this system, 
exposing the NYSE to full competition (interviewees RY, RZ, and EZ). The NYSE 
responded in the same way as Nasdaq. It too bought an ECN, and – drawing on the ECN’s 
technology (interviewee FB) – largely transformed itself into an open, anonymous, electronic 
order book market. Price competition was facilitated by the SEC’s imposition – in the face of 
fierce opposition from finance-sector incumbents (interviewee BE) – of a minimum price 
increment of a cent, rather than the previously standard eighth or sixteenth of a dollar. 
Competition among trading venues for market share forced US exchanges to open up 
previously private order books and grant electronic access to HFT firms. Some of the latter 
were immediately ready to trade at scale: ‘when we really turned on [i.e., connected to] the 
NYSE’, says interviewee AF, ‘we went from doing zero to 200 million shares a day in less 
than two weeks’. 
 The HFT/anonymous order-book agencement thus radically transformed US share 
trading. Gradually, though, a process internal to the agencement became ever more salient 
(see, especially, Budish et al., 2015). If prices start to move, market-making algorithms need 
to be able very rapidly to cancel their ‘stale’ bids or before another HFT algorithm ‘picks off’ 




anonymous order books into a relentless, expensive speed race with algorithms that seek to 
pick them off, and so gives them an incentive to experiment with market structures quite 
different from anonymous order books (such as the bilateral arrangements discussed below). 
 
The Agencement in Europe 
The emergence of a costly speed race at the heart of the HFT/order-book agencement did not 
stop US HFT firms being very successful. They therefore sought to replicate that success 
elsewhere. HFT in European shares was, however, initially unsuccessful. In the early 2000s, 
most European share trading took place either in a dealer-client market (in which the dealers 
were mainly London-based investment banks) or on ‘national champion’ exchanges such as 
the Paris Bourse and London Stock Exchange – which, despite their long histories of face-to-
face trading, had already switched to electronic trading and had successfully warded off 
sporadic challenges from rival pre-HFT electronic trading venues (Muniesa, 2003; Pardo 
Guerra, 2010). The US HFT firm for which interviewees AF and BF both worked ‘had all the 
[exchange] memberships lined up’, but found that ‘[o]ur exchange costs, our clearing costs, 
… all these costs’ were ‘way too high’ for HFT market-making to be viable: ‘[i]t was too 
expensive for us to trade’ [BF].  
 HFT in European shares thus encountered an economically inimical environment. A 
fundamental actor-network claim, however, is that agencements can potentially transform 
what appears to be their external context. AF’s and BF’s US-based HFT firm was heavily 
involved in doing just that: BF, for example, reports proposing to the US ECN-provider 
Instinet that it should create a new pan-European ECN. The chief difficulty faced was 
clearing. Unlike the situation in the US, with its single, nationwide clearinghouse, Europe 




Those clearinghouses seem not to have been enthusiastic about a new ECN, so Instinet’s new 
European ECN, Chi-X, ended up persuading the Belgo-Dutch bank Fortis to set up an 
entirely new clearinghouse, the European Multilateral Clearing Facility (EMCF), with much 
lower fees than the existing clearinghouses. Chi-X launched in April 2007, promising share 
trading that was ‘ten times faster, ten times cheaper’ than the established exchanges 
(interviewee EA). In October 2008, the US ECN BATS launched a European arm similar to 
Chi-X, also initially with the EMCF as its clearer.  
 As in the US, these new European share-trading venues were facilitated – in Europe, 
largely inadvertently – by changes in regulation. Although there was widespread agreement 
among European Union (EU) policy-makers and politicians that ‘the capital markets union 
project’ – the integration of national markets into a single EU-wide market – was, in the 
words of one of those politicians, ‘a flagship piece of work’, there was persistent 
disagreement on how best to achieve it (described, e.g., by interviewees SC and II). The 
generally neoliberal UK, ‘[s]upported by a bloc [including] the Netherlands … Ireland and … 
the Scandinavian countries’ (SC) faced a bloc usually headed by France (including Spain, 
Italy and sometimes Germany) that wished, inter alia, to protect ‘national-champion’ 
exchanges (see Quaglia, 2010). The influence of the latter bloc can be seen, for example, in 
the EU’s 1993 Investment Services Directive, which permitted member states to impose 
‘concentration rules’ that de facto required market participants to route orders only to 
national stock exchanges. 
 After ‘bitter and complex’ negotiations and ‘fierce clashes between the incumbent 
stock exchange sector and the emergent brokerage/OTC [i.e. dealer-client] sector’ (Moloney, 
2014, p. 438), the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID I, as 
it is now known) was approved in 2004. The clashes had not been over new ECN-like trading 




MiFID I. Just as Reg ATS had done in the US, MiFID I created a clear procedure for setting 
up a ‘multilateral trading facility’ or MTF, and the ‘best execution’ requirement that MiFID I 
imposed on dealers made it more difficult for the latter to ignore the new venues when their 
prices were better than those on incumbent exchanges. Pressure – some commercial, some 
from Brussels policy-makers – was brought to bear on Europe’s other share-trading 
clearinghouses to ‘interoperate’ electronically with EMCF (interviewees EA and BF), and, 
just as in the US, a more integrated clearing system facilitated competition among trading 
venues. Above all, in the words of a senior figure in one of the new venues, ‘MiFID I broke 
the concentration rules. … BATS and Chi-X wouldn’t be here probably’ if those rules had 
remained in place (interviewee GX). 
 The agencement as it took root in European share trading closely resembled the US 
original. The agencement’s dynamic was nearly identical: new, fast, cheap trading venues, 
with ‘tick sizes’ often smaller than those of the established venues, facilitated HFT, while 
HFT helped those venues grow. Initially, for example, Chi-X’s share of European stock 
trading was a mere 1-2 percent. Then, data given by Chi-X to economist Albert Menkveld 
show, an HFT market-making firm began to trade on Chi-X: our interviews suggest that this 
was the US firm that previously had to abandon trading European shares because it was too 
expensive. Menkveld’s data reveal that the prices of the bids and offers in Chi-X’s order book 
improved quickly and dramatically – there was ‘a 50% drop in the bid-ask spread’ – and Chi-
X ‘jumped to a double-digit share’ of the European market. By 2011, the ‘challenger’ Chi-X 
had surpassed all the incumbent exchanges to become Europe’s largest-volume share-trading 
venue (Menkveld, 2013, pp. 713-714).  
 




The telephone-based dealer-client agencement in Treasurys dates from the 1920s (Meeker, 
1930, p. 260). Substantial increases in government borrowing during the Second World War 
led to the Department of the Treasury and its bond-market agent, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (FRBNY), liaising closely with Treasurys dealers (McCormick, 2019). In 1960, 
the FRBNY began to designate selected banks and securities firms as ‘Primary Dealers’. 
These firms took on obligations to bid in the initial auctions of Treasurys, and coordinated the 
subsequent trading of them. Dealers used – and still use – the interdealer market to unwind 
the positions they took on in trading with clients. In the 1980s, this was also done by voice, 
over the permanently open telephone lines connecting each individual trader at each dealer 
with the half dozen or so interdealer brokers. Originally, interdealer brokers would repeatedly 
relay ‘runs’ – lists of prevailing prices – verbally to dealers, but by the 1980s all the main 
interdealer brokers firms used visual display screens to distribute prices to dealers 
(interviewee XV): see Figure 3. Providing these price screens to clients was, however, taboo. 
When the interdealer broker RMJ Securities started to do this in the late 1980s, it ‘blew up on 
them, right?’ (interviewee XV). RMJ ‘lost almost all of their [interdealer] business overnight’ 
(interviewee XP). Within a week, the firm reversed course, retreating to its traditional role as 
an intermediary between dealers. 
 The biggest of the interdealer brokers, Cantor Fitzgerald, was, however, not as easily 
disciplined as RMJ. Its screens were widely regarded by dealers as an indispensable guide to 
the interdealer market, and it was able, without retaliation, to give at least some non-dealers 
(Chicago pit traders who traded bond futures) access to those screens. Originally neither 
dealers nor the Chicago firms could directly place bids and offers on the screens that 
interdealer brokers provided: they had to ask a broker to do so. In 1999, however, Cantor 
Fitzgerald made its internal electronic system (rechristened ‘eSpeed’) ‘accessible through 




dealers direct access to Cantor’s electronic interdealer Treasurys order book. Dealers’ clients 
were not given access to eSpeed, but incumbent dealers nevertheless feared that sooner or 
later Cantor ‘was going to disintermediate banks’ (interviewee XO). ‘[W]e [major dealers] 
got together’, says XO, ‘and said let’s put this consortium [of dealers] together so that 
[clients] can directly access our bids and offers and not go through Cantor’. The result was 
Tradeweb, launched in 1998, an electronic trading system that was not an anonymous order 
book, but rather a means of automating the process of an institutional-investor client 
telephoning a small number of dealers to ask them to quote prices, in an interaction in which 
each party knows the other’s identity. As an innovation that respected the dealer-client 
distinction, and required only modest changes to existing work processes, Tradeweb was 
strikingly successful. Nor were the major dealers content to allow Cantor’s eSpeed to 
dominate electronic interdealer trading. As one dealer puts it: ‘you couldn’t deal with one 
guy. You just couldn’t deal with one guy (interviewee XO). Another consortium of major 
dealers, BrokerTec, was formed, and in 2000 it launched a rival anonymous electronic 
interdealer trading platform.  
The HFT/order book agencement fell into place. HFT firms had gained expertise and 
capital trading shares, and started to put out feelers to BrokerTec and eSpeed. The trading 
platforms anticipated some dealers being ‘pretty upset that the market was now being diluted’ 
(interviewee CA), but also knew that giving HFT firms access could increase trading volumes 
markedly. Once one platform allowed HFT firms in, the other had to do so too. As 
interviewee AB, whose HFT firm became heavily involved in the interdealer Treasurys 
market, said, ‘it was very important for us to be operating on both [BrokerTec and eSpeed] … 
because then one wouldn’t kick us off, out of fear that we would help the other take more 




firms are ‘way faster, they’re picking-off the dealers [executing against dealers’ price 
quotations that had not been updated quickly enough]’ – ‘it was too late’ to resist. 
 As in share trading, the agencement utterly transformed the Treasury’s interdealer 
market. For example, both BrokerTec and eSpeed had a feature known as the ‘work-up 
protocol’ – deeply irritating to high-frequency traders such as interviewee AC – that paused 
trading when a deal was struck to give the two parties to it (assumed to be human beings) the 
chance to negotiate a larger transaction at the same price. This pause, a practice inherited 
from how human brokers orchestrated interdealer trading, was gradually made shorter and 
shorter, leaving eSpeed and especially BrokerTec structurally very similar to agencement-
transformed share trading. In 2012, indeed, BrokerTec began leasing Nasdaq’s ultrafast 
Genium Inet share-trading matching engine technology. In 2013, Nasdaq itself bought 
eSpeed from Cantor. By 2015, only two of the ten largest-volume trading firms on 
BrokerTec, which has become the dominant interdealer platform, were dealers (JP Morgan 
and Barclays). The other eight were all HFT firms. In little more than two months of 2015, 
the eight HFT firms had traded Treasurys worth around $7 trillion: see Table 5. 
The agencement’s limits: Direct Match and bilateral trading 
Despite some dealer unhappiness, neither BrokerTec nor eSpeed faced a revolt against 
allowing HFT algorithms into the interdealer Treasurys market. What dealers ‘really cared 
about more’, says interviewee CA, ‘was not having client flow on screen’ – in other words, 
ensuring that clients continued to trade only via dealers, not directly. In 2016, though, a new 
anonymous electronic order-book trading platform, Direct Match, designed to allow clients to 
trade not just with dealers but with each other, was ready for launch. It was a controversial 
initiative – ‘it can be a career-threatening thing’ simply to invite a representative of a 




timing seemed promising. As noted, the largest dealers are all banks, and the more stringent 
capital requirements imposed by regulators since the financial crisis have considerably 
reduced banks’ willingness and/or capacity to hold large inventories of bonds. Direct Match 
was, in effect, an effort to create for the Treasurys market an equivalent of Island, the ECN 
via which the agencement had begun the process of changing the trading of shares. Direct 
Match’s matching engine was built to the same basic design as Island’s, and – just as Island 
had – it planned to offer a smaller ‘tick size’ than BrokerTec’s and eSpeed’s. If Direct Match 
had succeeded as Island had, the agencement would likely have transformed the entire 
Treasurys market, not just its interdealer segment.  
 The chief obstacle to Direct Match turned out to be clearing. In anonymous trading 
systems, a central ‘clearinghouse’ normally stands in between the two parties, preserving 
anonymity and protecting each party from a default by the anonymous other. In the Treasurys 
market, that role is played by the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), making it 
essential for a trading platform to have access to FICC. The qualifications for FICC 
membership, however, are daunting – ‘a net worth of at least $25 million and cash on hand of 
$10 million or more’ (Smith, 2016, p. 44) – and Direct Match, as a small start-up, could not 
itself meet them. It had, however, secured the apparent agreement of a major bank that was a 
FICC member to handle the clearing of trades on Direct Match. Around a week before Direct 
Match was due to launch, though, the bank ‘stopped answering calls. Finally get them on the 
phone and they bail out of it, citing conflicts [of interest]. Never really got explained’ 
(interviewee CC). Without access to FICC, and unable to raise the $25 million for FICC 
membership, Direct Match never launched. 
 Direct Match had sought to emulate the open, anonymous, order-book trading of 
shares. Share trading had also seen the emergence of dark pools (electronic trading venues in 




had successfully set up its own share-trading dark pool, but ‘the technology force[d] us’, 
however, to take a different route in Treasurys, he reports. The single most important 
technical system via which participants in the Treasurys market make trading decisions is the 
Ion aggregator, which collects bids and offers on display across the market. A dark pool with 
a hidden order book would have been invisible to the Ion system and thus to the majority of 
market participants. HFT market-making firms therefore did not try to create dark pools for 
Treasurys trading. Nor, in general, have they sought to trade directly with dealers’ clients, 
because cultivating these clients would mean spending money with no certainty of success. 
Instead, HFT firms have sought to supplement their activity on BrokerTec and eSpeed with 
direct bilateral trading arrangements with individual dealers: at first, mid-size Treasurys 
dealers, then more recently even the very largest dealers. In an arrangement of this kind, the 
HFT firm streams electronically executable Treasurys prices to the dealer – prices that can, 
e.g., be incorporated into the dealer’s Ion system – while (in some cases) the dealer’s systems 
also stream executable prices to the HFT firm. For the latter, this private bilateral 
arrangement is attractive because its algorithms are not at risk of being ‘picked-off’ by faster 
HFT algorithms, so the HFT firm can offer better prices than in anonymous order-book 
markets, which in turn makes bilateral trading with an HFT firm attractive to dealers.  
 What is fascinating about these private, non-anonymous bilateral arrangements is that 
HFT firms are careful not to exploit the greater speed of their systems:  
if Goldman is leaving a stale price on their book … and I then lift that price … I’m 
going to get a phone call from Goldman saying, ‘hey … that was a bit painful, cut it 
out’, or we can amend [the transaction]. And we do. … There are times where our 
own strategies will lock down [shut off automatically] if we’ve made too much 




The colonization of Treasurys trading by the HFT/anonymous order-book agencement 
is thus limited in scope essentially to BrokerTec and eSpeed: the dynamics of trading in the 
non-anonymous bilateral arrangements are quite different from those of trading in 
anonymous order books. What perhaps is most striking about the processes leading to this 
outcome is the absence in the Treasurys market of any trace of government intervention, 
which is such a significant part of the processes leading to the triumph in share trading of the 
HFT/anonymous order-book agencement. The Department of the Treasury is ever-present as 
the borrower, and its agent, the FRBNY, created and supervises the Primary Dealer system, 
but with only two real exceptions (Gabor, 2016; Scraggs 2016) government agencies have not 
intervened in recent decades to influence the structure of the Treasurys market, and, 
furthermore, neither exception is dramatic. 
 Why the lack of state intervention in the market structure of Treasurys trading? 
‘[R]emember, today is a Thursday,’ a former Department of the Treasury official 
(interviewee VS) told us in October 2016. On most Thursdays – indeed, most working days – 
Treasurys need to be sold: ‘Usually Monday through Thursday, there is one or more auctions 
that take place, and a Primary Dealer, whether you like it or not, you have to submit your 
bids.’ For the Department of the Treasury, that obligation is ‘reassuring’, says VS, and the 
Primary Dealer system gives the FRBNY the capacity to ‘use moral persuasion.’ The 
Treasurys market ‘is not like the equity market. … This market is special. … It’s the market 
that finances the sovereign’ (interviewee VS). The US very likely could continue reliably to 
sell Treasurys without the aid of Primary Dealers, but policy-makers cannot be certain of that 
in advance. Those Primary Dealers thus enjoy what Braun (2018) labels ‘infrastructural 
power’ – the power that private actors accrue by being part of mechanisms by which states 
act financially – which greatly limits the appetite of policy-makers for measures that would 




obligations involved in being a Primary Dealer. In the resultant absence of the government 
action found in share trading, the HFT/anonymous order-book agencement has been able 
only partially to alter that market structure. 
An agencement blocked: sovereign bonds in Europe 
The HFT agencement’s success in European sovereign bond trading has been even more 
limited. As in the US, trading is bifurcated, with separate interdealer and dealer-client 
markets. Although telephone trading remains important, there are mature systems for 
electronic trading in both markets. As in the US, clients use Tradeweb’s and Bloomberg’s 
systems (or the dealer-client system of MTS, for which see below) electronically to request 
price quotations from primary dealers. 
 The hugely salient difference from the US is that no HFT firm has gained access to 
any European sovereign bond interdealer market. The UK interdealer market remains 
dominated by voice brokers (as, e.g., interviewee FZ reports). The Eurozone interdealer 
market is more comparable to the US, because there is a long-established, heavily used 
interdealer electronic platform, MTS. Founded in 1988 as the Mercato dei Titoli di Stato by 
Italy’s Treasury and central bank, MTS was privatized in 1997 and gave birth in 1998 to a 
pan-European interdealer platform, EuroMTS. BrokerTec and eSpeed also launched 
European sovereign bond trading platforms, but by 2006 their joint market share was only 0.1 
percent (Persaud, 2006, Table 1), and our interview data make clear that they remain entirely 
overshadowed by MTS. In the words of interviewee EK, MTS became: 
 … almost part of the European acquis [the body of rights and obligations of EU 
 member states]: if you became part of the Euro, in particular, you had to have your 




 capacity to buy bonds with loans collateralized with those bonds] which were 
 critical for the money markets. 
 Governments, primary dealers, and MTS became part of what the MTS Group (2003, 
p. 3) described as a ‘Liquidity Pact’. This involves, primary dealers, which – as in the US –
are nearly always large banks (see the lists in AFME, 2017), taking on commitments to bid in 
primary auctions and facilitating subsequent trading by ‘adhering to specified criteria’ for the 
continuous posting of executable price quotations (MTS Group, 2003, p. 3). These bidding 
and market-making obligations can easily be loss-making (interviewee YB; see Lemoine, 
2013), but banks continue to act as primary dealers in part for fear of being ‘put on a … list’ 
(YB) and informally excluded from more profitable government business such as debt 
syndications – transactions the US does not undertake – and to a lesser extent potentially also 
privatizations. 
 In 2006, US-based HFT firms – by then trading successfully on BrokerTec and 
eSpeed in the US – began approaching MTS for access. In Europe, though, MTS was 
sufficiently dominant that there was no equivalent of the fierce battle for market share 
between BrokerTec and eSpeed that had facilitated the entry of HFT. There was, however, 
criticism – e.g. in a report (Persaud, 2006) commissioned by the London-based interdealer 
broker ICAP, which had bought BrokerTec – of rules that (e.g. in Italy) designated MTS as 
the platform on which primary dealers had to fulfil market-making obligations. When 
requests for access from HFT firms started to arrive, MTS’s leadership – which had 
ambitions for growth and international expansion (Chung & Tett, 2006) that HFT might have 
facilitated – ‘felt the need to listen [and] started a conversation’ (interviewee YB).  
 In the US, the competing interdealer platforms had given access to HFT firms without 




Treasury or FRBNY; as noted above, by the time dealers fully realized what had happened, 
effective resistance was impossible. In Europe, in contrast, most likely because of MTS’s 
semi-official role in the Eurozone8, MTS decided to speak publicly about the ‘conversation’ 
with HFT before allowing HFT firms to trade on the system. MTS’s Chief Executive talked 
to the Financial Times about it (Chung & Tett, 2006). The reaction from dealers was fiercely 
hostile. While the tone of the European Primary Dealers Association was measured – 
‘Allowing third party access … may upset the delicate balance in the euro government bond 
market’ (quoted in Chung & Tett, 2007) – behind the scenes some in ‘the dealer community 
… just went berserk. They literally went berserk’ (interviewee YB) and ‘threatened to stop 
using MTS all together’ (interviewee SF). One banker warned the Financial Times that 
‘People are furious. You could end up with a full-scale rebellion … that could rip the system 
apart’ (Chung & Tett, 2007). 
 The controversy, reports interviewee YB, cost several of MTS’s senior executives 
their jobs, and any suggestion of allowing HFT firms access to MTS seems to have been 
shelved indefinitely. HFT interviewees describe UK, Eurozone, and other European 
interdealer sovereign bond trading as impossible to access: ‘[t]hey wouldn’t let us on’ 
(interviewee BU); it’s ‘a club that we can’t get into’ (AG).9 This is not arbitrary exclusion but 
a matter of explicit rules and taken-for-granted understandings. Rules include, e.g., minimum 
                                                             
8 The rapid expansion of MTS was promoted by primary dealers who embraced the platform (SF), because it 
reduced their need to risk capital by trading on other platforms. As one European regulator put it ‘we were quite 
happy how the market [for electronic bond dealing] organized itself’ (SE). Persaud (2006) estimates that by 
2005 MTS platforms account for over 70 percent of electronic European cash government bonds trading. 
9 The only European sovereign-bond HFT we have found takes place on a relatively small scale on the Bolsa 
Italiana, which has made ‘government bonds … tradeable electronically just like [shares] and … centrally 
cleared’ (interviewee CR). Trading is informed by prices in the interdealer market, which (bizarrely for HFT) 




capital requirements for participants in interdealer markets that considerably exceed the sums 
available to most HFT firms (for a sample of requirements, see AFME, 2017). The taken-for-
granted understanding is that ‘membership is limited to institutional intermediaries 
(essentially banks)’ (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2017, p. 11). 
 Rules can of course be changed, and tacit understandings challenged, but European 
governments – however neoliberal their overall ideologies – have not done so. According to a 
European regulator interviewed, this was indeed ‘not a matter of culture. Look at the 
Netherlands, Ireland or Germany, these are all neoliberal countries in terms of financial 
markets. They would do it [allow HFT in their bond markets] if they thought it bought 
advantages to them’ (SG). The energetic EU reforms from the early 2000s onwards of the 
market structure of share trading (the elimination of concentration rules, for example) have 
not been echoed in the trading of sovereign bonds. As interviewee SC, a politician heavily 
involved in regulatory reform, told us: 
 dealers … have to be authorized by [government debt management offices] to 
 participate.  … [P]roprietary trading houses [such as HFT firms] would not meet the 
 criteria … in most cases. 
 First author: [Do] you get a sense that people in the regulatory/political sphere are 
 perfectly content with that? 
 Interviewee SC: They can control a small number of dealers, so they can control their 
 primary issuance [the initial auctioning of sovereign bonds] in a way they wouldn’t be 
 able to if they actually took it totally and utterly to a much broader audience. 
Interviewee CR, for instance, reports the Italian Ministry of Finance as being ‘uncomfortable 
with non-banks’ such as HFT firms, because their entry would further reduce ‘the 




the role. In the words of one debt management official: ‘The [primary dealer] system has 
proved itself to be resilient, it’s working, why change it?’ (SH). This assessment was echoed 
by a European regulator stating that ‘the system works, there is no need to change it’ (SI). 
This continued support sits alongside both the preferences of the international debt 
management community and international organizations’ sense of ‘best practice’ remaining 
supportive of the primary dealer system in advanced economies (IMF 2014; IMF & World 
Bank 2002).10 A primary dealer spells out the reasons for governments’ reluctance to be 
swayed by HFT firms’ argument that ‘algo trading makes the market more efficient’: 
 you can shout and scream as much as you want and you call about clubbing [barriers 
 to entry] but … if I’m an Italian [government] debt manager and I have [€] two 
 trillion debts to service of which [€] 300 billion a year to issue, I don’t care if you’re a 
 hedge fund in America and you talk to me about price efficiency. Go and take a hike. 
 … [I]f you want to come, guarantee to me that you’re going to buy 3 percent of my 
 debt and get a banking licence, come on board. If not, go to hell … if I’m a sensible 
 regulator, I’m a sensible politician, do I really want to cater for my  people in difficult 
 times or do I want to cater for the profitability of these [algorithmic trading] geniuses? 
 (Interviewee YB)  
Conclusion 
                                                             
10 The special status of the sovereign bond market is not to be reduced to the costs and risks of financing the 
state but extend well into other markets (notably shares) and policy areas (such as monetary and housing 
policy). In the simile of one interviewee: ‘debt management is like the plumbing of the house, everybody 
expects it will work and nobody cares about it unless there is a crisis’ (SG). The past decade of quantitative 
easing and historically low bond yields across a varied group of sovereign borrowers have cast doubt on the 
power of market discipline (cf. author, 2019, p.5). At the same time, Europe’s debt crises as well as a recent 
string of litigation and court rulings on developing world sovereign debt have challenged preexisting 
conceptions of sovereignty in debt markets. Given these underlying high structural stakes and recent 




Factors of two broad kinds can be seen at work in the development of market structure in the 
four cases we have examined here (and, indeed, in the other classes of financial instrument 
covered in our broader research). Factors of the first kind include the components of the 
HFT/anonymous order-book agencement: fast matching engines, fast data dissemination to 
algorithms and fast order placement by those algorithms, small ‘tick sizes’, microwave links, 
and so on. These components are, broadly, technical, but not just technical. They are 
sociomaterial in at least two senses: they are not technically inevitable, but unconscious or 
conscious choices as to how to design the large technical network that share trading (and also 
interdealer Treasurys trading) has become;11 and they have in their ensemble major 
socioeconomic effects, transforming traditional exchanges and largely sweeping aside dealer-
client trading of shares. Technical components of the dealer-client agencement, such as the 
Ion aggregator, have been less dramatic in their effects, but are important nonetheless. Ion’s 
central role, for example, seems to have helped push change in Treasurys market structure 
away from the path followed in share trading and towards the intriguing bilateral 
arrangements sketched in that section of this article. The development of market structure 
cannot be understood in abstraction from that structure’s materiality. 
 All of that is entirely consistent with ‘actor-network’ analyses of markets of the sort 
inspired above all by Callon (1998, etc.). Yet factors of a second kind – much less frequently 
invoked in actor-network analyses – are also prominent in our narratives: the conflict 
between incumbents and challengers and the diverse roles of the state and its agencies in the 
outcome of such conflicts. In the cases of both US and European shares, the crucial role of 
government regulators has been to promote of competition. Sovereign bonds are quite 
different. States have intervened in the structure of the markets for sovereign bonds, but 
                                                             
11 Electronic trading, for example, does not have to be continuous, but could take the form of frequent discrete 




where the enhancement of competition has been the goal, this was within a clearly 
demarcated dealer-client boundary.12 What is more, – some minor ‘tweaks’ aside – these 
interventions were not recent. The last major US government intervention in the structure of 
the Treasurys market was the creation of the primary dealer system in 1960; substantial 
market-structure interventions by European governments were largely complete by 2005. 
 Different agencies of the state do not, of course, always act consistently one with the 
other. While finance ministries and debt management offices in both the US and Europe 
remain committed to the primary dealer system (and thus, implicitly, to a dealer-client market 
structure), banking regulators have, as noted, weakened dealers’ capacity or willingness to 
hold inventories by imposing more stringent capital requirements. Furthermore, the 
consequences of state action (or inaction) vary according to circumstances, and those 
circumstances include existing market structure. That the ‘club’ of sovereign bond trading 
remains essentially closed to HFT in Europe, while partly open in the US, is most likely 
explained in part by the way in which the dealer-client structure in European sovereign-bond 
trading is a result of deliberate government initiatives – a result that governments scarred by 
the Eurozone crisis may lack the confidence to allow to be altered even partially: Braun’s 
(2018) ‘infrastructural power’ is perhaps relevant here. As Culpepper (2015) cautions, clearly 
identifying the structural power of any business is particularly difficult in cases involving a 
congruence of interests, as was arguably the case when HFT firms were excluded from MTS. 
The ‘if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it’ attitude of our DMO interviewees is only congruence on 
one level, however; HFT claims of greater liquidity and tighter dealing spreads were seen as 
justifying close consideration. A less direct effect also seems to be involved in the likelihood 
of change. In the US, for the largely idiosyncratic reasons explored in our discussion of 
                                                             
12 An example for this boundary-respecting competition is the decision of a few Eurozone countries to use 




Treasurys, the interdealer market had two fiercely competing electronic platforms – one set 
up by the leading inter-dealer broker Cantor Fitzgerald and the other set up by a consortium 
of dealers alarmed by Cantor’s dominance – that HFT firms could, as it were, implicitly play 
off against each other. In Europe, in contrast, there has been only one interdealer electronic 
platform with any substantial volume of trading: MTS – a platform, furthermore, that was 
tightly bound in to the creation of the Euro and of a Eurozone-wide sovereign bond market. 
  It is, of course, easy to think that actor-network and political economy (e.g. field 
theory) perspectives involve intrinsically incompatible ontologies: that, for example, was 
very much the perception in France when actor-network theory first became prominent. As 
we have argued elsewhere, however, we see their differences as, at least in part, an empirical 
matter rather than an a priori ontological one (author, 2019). Furthermore, some of the 
phenomena we have examined straddle the apparent material/political divide almost 
explicitly. ‘Infrastructural power’ has material foundations, and clearing – differences in the 
arrangements for which have major effects, for example facilitating change in market 
structure for US shares and inhibiting it in Treasurys – is a material process (for an actor-
network analysis of clearing, see Millo et al., 2005).  Because market participants usually 
realize how important clearing is, its arrangements can be deeply controversial – with, for 
example, actors from the political system recruited to battles over proposed changes. (An 
example from our wider study is futures trading. There, competition between exchanges is 
greatly inhibited by ‘vertical silo’ clearing arrangements in which each futures exchange 
owns and controls its own clearinghouse, and can refuse to clear competing versions of the 
exchange’s products.  At the time of writing, there is fierce subterranean struggle in Europe 
over these clearing arrangements.13) In all the classes of financial instrument we have 
                                                             
13 Europe’s January 2018 MiFID II regulations include ‘open access’ rules governing clearing that would end 




examined, we have found the arrangements for clearing to be a pervasively important 
facilitator of or barrier to changes in market structure.  
 We do not claim, however, to have offered a definitive analysis of what can therefore 
perhaps best be called the material political economy of market structure, even in the four 
cases examined here. A more adequate analysis would, for example, have to disaggregate 
‘Europe’ into its different states, because different countries, even within the Eurozone, have 
somewhat differently structured sovereign bond markets: practices in the German market, for 
instance, are heavily influenced by the tight link between Bunds and the interest-rate futures 
traded by the Frankfurt-based futures exchange, Eurex. Nevertheless, we hope that our 
analysis has shown both that it can be productive to focus on the politics of market structure, 
and that quite different intellectual traditions need to be combined in order to understand the 
intricate contours of that politics. 
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Table 1.  Ideal type descriptions of the dealer-client agencement and the HFT/anonymous 
order-book agencement. 




Slow and non-anonymous; 
interpersonal relationships are 
important; price increments with 
relatively large ‘tick sizes’ 
 
Fast and anonymous; 
interpersonal relations are 
relatively unimportant; price 





Market consists of an inter-dealer 
and dealer-client segment; 
interdealer segment intermediated 
by inter-dealer brokers; dealer-
client segment intermediated by 
(primary) dealers  
 
Bids and offers are aggregated in a 
central limit order book, which 




mechanisms of trust and defiance 
are relatively important. Large 




expertise and organisational 
efficiency are relatively important. 





Trading in dealer-client segment 
phone-based, or screen-based with 
‘request for quote’ software 
replicating phone-based 
interaction; price dissemination in 
inter-dealer segment sometimes 
screen-based.  
Bids and offers placed and 
executed by algorithms; orders are 
aggregated in the datacentres of 






Table 2. The relative presence of the two agencements in the main classes of highly liquid 
financial instrument 
 US Europe 
Shares Dominated by anonymous 
order books and HFT 
Dominated by anonymous 
order books and HFT 
Sovereign bonds Dealer-client market, but 
with anonymous order 
books and HFT in 
interdealer trading 
Almost intact dealer-client 
market 
Futures Dominated by anonymous 
order books and HFT 
Dominated by anonymous 
order books and HFT 
Foreign exchange Dealer-client market; 
partially colonized by 
anonymous order books and 
HFT 
Dealer-client market; 
partially colonized by 
anonymous order books and 
HFT 
Listed options Dominated by anonymous 
order books but not HFT 
Some anonymous order-
book trading but much 
dealer intermediation 
Interest-rate swaps Despite anonymous order 
books, largely intact dealer-
client market 
Despite anonymous order 
books, largely intact dealer-
client market 
 




Table 3. Proportion of trading that is dealer-intermediated in selected markets (2015 unless 
otherwise indicated) 
US shares 17% 
European shares (2018) 19% 
US Treasurys 65% 
UK Gilts 90% 
German Bunds >95% 
Foreign exchange 60% 
Interest-rate derivatives (e.g. swaps) 90% 
 





Table 4. Interviewees 
Founders, employees or former employees 
of HFT firms (AA-DC) 
 80 
Dealer, brokers and brokerdealers (XA-YE) 31 
Exchange, clearing house, and other trading 
venue members and staff (EA-HC) 
81 
Manual traders (MA-ML) 12 
Traders for investment-management firms 
(IA-IJ) 
10 
Practitioners of other forms of algorithmic 
trading (OA-OV) 
22 
Regulators, lawyers, lobbyists, debt 
management office staff and politicans (RA-
SI) 
35 
Suppliers of technology and 
communications links (TA-UD) 
30 
Researchers and market analysts (VA-VT) 20 
Total 321 
 






Table 5. Most active participants in BrokerTec in May and June 2015 by trading volume 
 Volume (billions of US 
dollars) 
Share of ‘top ten’ volume 
Jump 2,291 28.5% 
Citadel 1,004 12.5% 
Teza 905 11.2% 
KCG (Knight Capital Getco) 798 9.9% 
JP Morgan 649 8.1% 
Spire-X (Tower) 564 7.0% 
XR Trading 554 6.9% 
Barclays 483 6.0% 
DRW 400 5.0% 
Rigel Cove (Virtu) 400 5.0% 
Overall total volume 8,049  
 
Source: BrokerTec unpublished list, as reproduced by Smith (2015). As Smith notes, the top-
ten volume seems to exceed the total volume that can be inferred from BrokerTec’s reports of 
average daily volumes in May and June 2015, so top-ten volume is most likely being 
measured over a slightly longer period. The dominant role of HFT firms, particularly Jump, is 



















Figure 1. An order book  
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Figure 3. Traders’ desks at a Treasurys dealer, late 1980s. Source: interviewee XU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
